We empirically estimate positional "wins above replacement" (WAR) in the National Football League (NFL). Positional WAR measures the value of players in the NFL, by position, in terms of generating wins. WAR is a commonly used metric to evaluate individual players in professional baseball and basketball in the United States, but to the best of our knowledge this is the first study to construct WAR measures for American football. A key challenge in constructing these measures is that individual statistics for many football players are not as welldeveloped as in baseball and basketball. Related to this point, the productivity of individual football players, perhaps more than players in any other major sport, is highly dependent on context. We circumvent issues related to measuring productivity for individual players by constructing WAR measures at the position rather than individual level. The identifying variation that we leverage in our study is generated by arguably exogenous player injuries and suspensions. Using data from three seasons and all 32 NFL teams, we show that the most valuable positions in the NFL are quarterback, wide receiver, tight end/fullback and offensive tackle. Perhaps our most surprising finding is that positional WAR for all positions on the defensive side of the football is zero.
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Introduction
"Wins Above Replacement" (WAR) and similar, data-driven metrics of player productivity are increasingly used by front-office personnel for professional sports franchises to evaluate players (Barnwell, 2014; Fleming, 2013; London, 2014) . These metrics are statistical constructs based on individual and team performance measures, and their incorporation into player assessment represents a fundamental shift in how professional franchises evaluate athletes (DuPaul, 2012) Though popularized by the book, this type of model was formally presented by Blass (1992) over a decade earlier with an application to player wages.
Building on the approach popularized in Moneyball, Gerard (2007) discusses the challenges of applying statistical measures of player productivity to team sports where individual statistics are dependent on teammate performance. He presents a conceptual model and applies it to soccer players in the English Premier League. A similar approach has also been applied to basketball players by Berri, Schmidt and Brook (2007) and Hollinger (2014) . Berri, Schmidt and Brook use a regression framework to create a metric called "Wins Produced." Hollinger's "Estimated Wins Added" converts individual player statistics into measures of team wins. 1 A conceptual similarity between both of these basketball metrics is that they compare each player's 1 Based on Hollinger's popularized "Player Efficiency Rating" (PER) metric.
2 contribution to a hypothetical replacement player, thus the "Wins Above Replacement"
terminology.
All currently estimated WAR measures of which we are aware are based on the idea that individual statistics can be translated into measures of contributions to team wins. However, linking individual player statistics to wins is particularly challenging in American football. As discussed by Gerard (2007) , an individual player's statistics in football depend on the performance of other teammates more so than in other sports. For example, consider a one-yard touchdown run by a running back. The touchdown is officially attributed to the running back, but how much of that touchdown is due to his performance and how much is due to the blocking performance of the offensive line (the latter being particularly difficult to measure with individual player statistics)? And what if the play was set up by an 80 yard punt return? The interdependence of individual player performance in American football makes it difficult to use individual statistics to measure the marginal productivity of labor.
These challenges notwithstanding, some productivity metrics have been developed for players in the National Football League (NFL). These metrics are summarized by Berri and Burke (2012) , but they all assume that individual player statistics are independent of the contributions of teammates. Realizing this issue, Oliver (2014) 
Data
We construct a data panel for all 32 NFL teams containing performance (wins) and injury/suspension information for three years: 2008, 2010, and 2012. 3 We use even-numbered years instead of all years to reduce the data collection burden; collecting the injury and suspension data is labor intensive (see Appendix A). We spaced out the three years of data 3 Obtaining game-by-game injury data prior to 2008 is difficult (especially for non-skill positions).
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collection to reduce the intra-team correlation in outcomes in the data panel, which improves statistical power.
The independent variables of interest in our analysis measure games lost to injury and suspension, by position, for each NFL team in each year. To build these variables we first identified the projected starting lineup for each team in each year prior to the first game of the season. 4 We then determined the number of games that each projected starter lost to injury and/or suspension using a variety of sources (e.g., news articles, fantasy football updates, and injury reports). 5 Of course, some starters missed games for other reasons, such as a demotion; however, our identification strategy relies entirely on using variation from games missed due to injury and suspension, so we code up only games missed for these reasons.
To construct the dataset we began by determining the number of projected starters at each We combine some positions to improve statistical power. An example is the tight-end/fullback position. Similarly, we group interior and exterior defensive lineman. In the extensions section we discuss the robustness of our findings to alternative positional groupings, but use the above groupings for our main analysis. 9 Table 1 shows the average shares of games missed for NFL teams at each position due to injury and suspension over the course of our data panel.
Empirical Strategy
To estimate positional WAR in the NFL we estimate the following empirical model:
In (1) it  is the error term. We cluster the standard errors from equation (1) at the team level.
9 Another advantage of grouping tight ends and fullbacks is that it reduces concerns about the influence of endogenous positional groupings. On the offensive side of the football, the most common positional difference across starting lineups (by far) is whether they include two tight ends or one tight end and one fullback. 10 We also estimate a model with an additional control variable for strength of schedule based on the record of each team's opponents from the previous year. Our positional WAR findings are essentially unaffected by including this control.
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The coefficients 1 10   estimated from equation (1) will represent unbiased, causal estimates of the value of starters over replacements, by position, under the condition that games lost due to injury and suspension are exogenous. The argument for exogeneity is compelling, but not absolute. On the one hand, it is reasonable to assume that future injuries and suspensions will be very difficult to predict ex ante for the vast majority of players. However, one might worry that injuries and suspensions can be predicted to some extent. Suppose, for example, that a team has a projected starter with a long and well-documented history of injuries. We might expect the team to invest in a better backup player, at least at the margin. This type of compensating behavior could lead us to underestimate positional WAR in general because it would imply that the replacement players who replace the injured players in our data are better than a replacement for a randomly-injured player. Comparisons of positional WAR across positions will be preserved, however, unless one believes that teams systematically "insure" players with injury histories more or less depending on their position. Table 2 shows results from the estimation of equation (1) We note two complications with interpreting the estimates in Table 2 . First, the variables of interest are coded as the percentage of games missed at each position. Thus, the strict interpretation of the coefficients is that they indicate the effect of going from 0 to 100 percent games missed on total wins. However, interpreting the estimates in this way involves 9 extrapolating well out of the range of variation in the data, as indicated by Table 1 . Second, the percentage variables for games missed by position correspond to different numbers of total games missed. For example, losing 50 percent of the games at quarterback corresponds to missing 8 games, whereas losing 50 percent of the games at wide receiver corresponds to missing almost 17 games (on average across teams -see Table 1 ).
Results
To provide a more direct comparison of positional value based on our estimates, Table 3 shows the effect of losing exactly four games due to injury/suspension at each position based on our estimates in Table 2 . We use the estimates from the model that includes the predicted-wins variable (the first set of estimates shown in Table 2 ). Table 3 To put our estimates into context, consider that the average number of wins in the NFL is eight. When a quarterback is injured for four games, the team is expected to lose more than one additional game, on average, which is a large effect. We also reinforce the point that our estimates of positional WAR should be interpreted to indicate positional value on average, not the value of individual players. They do not preclude situations where an individual player at a position with low positional WAR is more valuable than an individual player at a position with higher positional WAR. The extended model shown in Table 4 suggests that between tight ends and fullbacks, it is the fullback position that is more important. Note that this is only a nominal result -put differently, we cannot statistically reject the null hypothesis that tight ends and fullbacks are equally valuable. Still, the fact that our combined tight-end/fullback estimate is not driven by tight ends runs counter to what one might expect given the rising prominence of the tight-end position in the NFL (Benoit, 2012) .
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Sensitivity Analysis
We can only speculate as to why fullbacks are important for wins. One possibility is that the decline of the prominence of the position in the modern NFL is driven in part by the lack of availability of starter-quality fullbacks, which would make the fullbacks we do see more valuable. It may also be that the use of a fullback implies a dearth of talent on the roster, which would impact our positional WAR estimates driven by the difference in talent between starters and reserves -put differently, maybe all teams would rather start an additional player at a different position rather than a fullback, but some teams do not have a strong "next in line" tight end or wide receiver. Finally, some circumstances might add considerable value to fullbacks; for example, it may be that there are quarterbacks who perform better with backfield blocking, which is typically a role filled by the fullback.
Discussion
While it is beyond the scope of the present study to perform an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms that contribute to our positional WAR findings, in this section we briefly discuss three plausible explanations for why some positions have higher WAR values than others. In particular, we discuss (1) the importance of scheme in compensating for losses in player quality, (2) positional talent scarcity, and (3) constraints that affect franchises' team-building decisions.
With regard to our findings on the defensive side of the football, one possible explanation for the lack of positive positional WAR is that defensive schemes can be adjusted to account for replacement players more easily than offensive schemes. For example, a downgrade at cornerback can be facilitated by more help from safeties and/or a broader adjustment to the coverage scheme. Losing one player on defense may not have a significant impact if the other players are able to continue functioning as a whole. This would not imply that defensive positions are insignificant; rather, it would imply that defenses overall function as a unit in which individual personnel are more easily interchangeable. It is also important to remember that our findings are estimated within the current investment equilibrium in professional football. It would be a mistake to interpret our findings to imply that a defense consisting entirely of backup players would perform no worse than a defense full of starters. Put differently, our finding that teams can fully compensate for the loss of an injured player on defense with their current personnel, on average, does not mean that a defense would not be affected by the simultaneous downgrade of numerous defensive positions at the same time. Still, our findings for defensive positions are not consistent with the popular "defense wins championships" mantra, although our study is not the first to suggest that offensive efficacy is more important. A more thorough look at regular season success shows that teams with better offenses win more frequently than teams with the better defenses (Moskowitz, 2012) . Further research has looked at the distribution of success of past offenses and defenses and found that exceptionally talented offenses are more successful than exceptionally talented defenses (Burke, 2008) . Our results complement these previous studies by showing that the value of starting players at several offensive positions is greater than that of their defensive counterparts.
In addition to potentially driving our findings for defensive players, scheme may also be important on offense as well. Consider the comparison of exterior and interior offensive linemen as an example. It may be that teams can largely compensate for the loss of a starting interior offensive lineman by changing responsibilities within the line, while for an exterior lineman compensation might require diverting other players to help as blockers, such as a tight ends, fullbacks or running backs.
A second explanation for our findings is differences across positions in the scarcity of talent. Because positional WAR inherently measures starter quality relative to the quality of replacements, if there is a high supply of talented players at a given position, then the drop off between the starter and the backup will be less and positional WAR will be small. Anecdotally, the position where talent is the most scarce is quarterback, and unsurprisingly we find the largest positive WAR for the quarterback position by a wide margin.
A third explanation for our findings relates to the constraints that NFL franchises operate within to build their teams. These constraints include the salary cap, the cap on roster size, and limited draft picks, all of which force teams to make talent tradeoffs throughout their rosters. quarterbacks on their roster, the willingness to pay of teams who would use that player in a starting role will be higher (whether in terms of salary or other scarce resources, like draft picks).
The differential value that the same player might provide to two separate teams is discussed by Leeds and Kowalewksi (2001) in the context of understanding how free agency can affect player salaries. With each team facing a budget and roster size constraint, it is not an equilibrium outcome (subject to contract rigidities) to have players serving as non-starters when inferior players are starting for other teams. Another case occurred in the 2012 draft when the St. Louis Rams had the second overall pick, which could be used to choose another highly-regarded quarterback, Robert Griffin III. They already had a quarterback of starting quality, Sam Bradford, and were able to trade the second pick, which to them would have been the equivalent of a high-quality backup, to the Washington Redskins for six draft picks.
Finally, we conclude with a brief examination of whether NFL teams act as if they have knowledge of positional WAR in making their personnel decisions. We focus on how decision makers use one of the scarce resources at their disposal -first-round draft picks. Specifically, we correlate the share of first-round draft picks devoted to different positions, weighted by the inverse of the positional share in the average NFL starting lineup, with positional WAR (using the 4-game measures from Table 3 ). We do this for the five NFL drafts spanning our data panel:
2008-2012. The weighting by positional share is necessary because, for example, all else equal a team will draft more wide receivers than quarterbacks owing to the fact that wide receivers constitute a larger share of the starting lineup.
14 With the important caveat that the correlation between first-round draft share and positional WAR is calculated based on a small number of items (our 10 primary positional categories), and thus is imprecise, we estimate that it is positive at 0.33. Further investigation reveals that the positive correlation is driven entirely by the overrepresentation of quarterbacks as first-round draft picks given their high positional WAR. Our correlational analysis offers suggestive evidence that NFL decision makers understand some but not all aspects of positional value. In football, like with other sports, it will be of interest in future research to monitor the responsiveness of personnel decisions to the rapidly increasing base of empirical information about player productivity.
14 The "usage weighted" draft share (UWD) for each position p is calculated using the formula *( ) Table 1 . Intuitively, this formula gives more weight to positions that take up a smaller share of the starting lineup to account for variation in team needs driven by positional share alone.
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Conclusion
The contribution of the present study has been to develop an empirical approach for estimating positional WAR in the National Football League. Our identification strategy leverages the use of replacement players when starters miss games due to injury and suspension. Using data from all 32 NFL teams over three seasons we find that games lost by starting quarterbacks are by far the most important in terms of affecting win totals. We also show that games lost by starting wide receivers, fullbacks/tight-ends and exterior offensive lineman are important. Games lost by starters at all other positions do not affect wins, on average.
Our study represents the first rigorous attempt to quantify positional value in the NFL of which we are aware and moves us toward an improved understanding how players contribute to team wins in football. Future research can advance this line of study in several ways. One direction would be replicate our approach in other sports where individual performance measures can be constructed that are less dependent on the performance of other players. Aggregating the individual performance measures in these sports to the position level should produce positional WAR measures that align with those estimated using our approach based on injuries and suspensions, and discrepancies would be worthy of investigation. Our approach can also be replicated at the college level, where, like in the NFL, football is a major business and generates significant revenue (Isidore, 2013) . 15 In addition, one could imagine using more and better data in the future to identify the value of particular player attributes by position (e.g., speed, height, weight, etc.), and the interaction of player attributes on the field. Finally, our findings can help to inform the development of the theoretical literature on constrained team building (as in Leeds and Kawolewksi, 2001) , and relatedly, to help NFL executives aiming to maximize wins subject to constraints such as the salary cap and access to draft picks. There are no statistically significant differences for any position at the 5 percent level, although the differences for cornerbacks (more likely to get injured) and tight ends/fullbacks (less likely to get injured) are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. This appendix describes the data collection process in more detail -in particular, how projected starters were determined and how injury and suspension data were gathered. ProFootball-Reference (pro-football-reference.com) was used as the base system for identifying starters. We compared players listed online with pre-season depth charts from OurLad's NFL Scouting Services (ourlads.com). We checked through depth charts as early as June to catch changes to projected starters. Players that suddenly disappeared from a pre-season depth chart were analyzed with Pro Football Weekly's (profootballweekly.com) injury reports to determine whether or not they had suffered a pre-season injury. If so, statistics from previous years, in addition to fantasy-football updates, were used to determine whether the player would have started for the team in the absence of the injury.
The most challenging aspect of determining starters relates to fluctuations in position groups such as wide receivers, tight ends, fullbacks, linebackers and defensive linemen. Position shares in the starting lineup were determined by examining past statistics, games started during the current year by position, fantasy football updates, and seasonal depth charts. A player that was listed as having started all 16 games was given the designation of "starter" for that team in that year, so long as there were no injuries to other players that might have led to him being given that opportunity to start. For a player who started some but not all games, we checked his fantasy football updates throughout the entire season to determine whether he should be designated as a starter.
When we learned that a projected started had not started all 16 games, we first determined which games were missed. Sometimes this information was available in the player's ESPN game logs (espn.com). For more obscure players, missed games were again determined 23 through fantasy football updates. After identifying the specific games missed by a projected starter, team injury reports and fantasy football updates were used to determine the cause for the missed game. Players often missed games as "healthy scratches," due to competition from other players, trades, holdouts, and for rest (particularly at the end of the year for teams with a secure playoff position). Games missed for these reasons were not used in our empirical analysis.
To illustrate the full process of filling out the data, we use the somewhat complicated Thus, we determined that John Skelton was the initial starter. However, we can see that Skelton started just six games in 2012. Using the same website, we found that Skelton suffered a low ankle sprain in the first game of the season, which resulted in him missing the next three games. This is well documented in RotoWorld's fantasy updates. Thus far we have learned that the Cardinals lost at least three games at quarterback due to injury during 2012. Reading forward on the fantasy updates, we determined that Skelton was healthy enough to play in week five but did not start because Kolb was playing well in Skelton's absence. Throughout the rest of the season, we find that Skelton remained healthy but was in and out of the starting lineup, starting only five other games. The reasons for him not staring beyond game-4 were not due to injury. Thus, the missed-games variable for the Cardinals' starting quarterback position in 2012 in our data indicates that 3 out of 16 games were missed due to injury and/or suspension.
